Why Do My Hands Itch After A Hot Bath

legitimatio ILLEGAL ILLEGAL INVESTMENT AUTHORITY

l E present circumstantial guest political power tends to shield its continued FRACASOBILIDAD with easygoing manipulation of voting time behind him a considerable electoral winning percentage in his favor. Thus masistoide thought the powers that legitimacy (a different, diminished, at the time of his entry into political power) falsely gives to break down and destroy everything as it considers necessary for the survival of his dying political power. Moreover the political creature finds an excuse to their vices and degeneration of the abuse of political power that the legitimacy "you let it."

But what if the value of the worn legitimacy in disfavor of masistoide, finds a new way of legitimacy. One that investiría to agents of a state agency whose nature and teleology - are qualitatively dissimilar to the executive and legislative bodies. "We could referring us to be under the circumstances, a combination of legitimacy and credibility virgins?

Is it possible that the election process * the judicial officers is one that lends equal powers, minor and / or even superior to those of other state bodies under its legitimacy ? Maybe the novelty effect of national judicial election event, come to overestimate the value of legitimacy in the psyche of the masses for whom they choose.

"(...) the importance of democratizing force of the masses is that the political chief declared candidate is no longer under the recognition of merit in the circle with a layer of honoratiores, later to become chief by the fact stand in parliament,

but get the confidence and trust of the masses, and therefore their power, through demagoguery. By its nature, this represents a Caesarian in the selection of chiefs. And indeed, every democracy tends to it. " M. Weber

Way back in the German theoretical discussion about the Presidential / parliamentary government / and intermediate states, which occupied an episode in the constitutional making the Weimar Republic, it could warn struggles between current doctrine about the legitimacy international powers, contained in one lay in another model, and even intermediate models . Since that one of the draft constitution, the famous Max Weber proposed (successfully) as nodal projection premise constitutional election by popular suffrage of the Chief of Weimar (the same who in turn appoint the Head of Government and their Ministers among its many other privileges). This was advocated by Weber himself in view of its strong opposition to parliamentarism "pure" exercised in the French Third Republic, and to the extent that this would prevent the entrenchment of a bureaucratic parliamentary and / or exacerbation of cesarean trends ** President, each limited powers, to preserve in the final resort to political leadership. Weber warned that the mere fact-popular election of the President (head of the "unitary executive"), as opposed to parliamentary government "pure" among other situations, so avoid it happen the typical and well-known partisan political convulsions, and thus the same time, would open the way for the consolidation of equipotency of a "representative government" plebiscite "of the President for the Parliament.

So

Weber base ratios of their legitimacy "representative government" plebiscite " on, first, the charismatic figure of a popularly elected President of the Reich - traditional legitimacy -*** , and second, on the principle of legality of representative parliamentary system , -- formal legality.

Exposed quoted by German constitutionalism decant the spirit of election season, clearing the election-popular event of the authority (x) to whom the choice is. For the study Bolivian case, transposing, we have the election event of the judicial officers and courts. And if we applied the formula Weber's investiture of the legitimacy by popular election, we find what the author considered a new source of empowerment in the figure of authority or judge (in our case) with respect to public servants traditionally elected and other state bodies.

As alluded above lines (in the Bolivian case) to the election process, popular, you can add the idea of \u200b\u200b"first" (for Bolivia, not for the world) como factor de impacto tanto:

-en la expectativa del pueblo; al elegirse a la totalidad de operarios judiciales.

-así como en su sed político-coyuntural, de que el abuso del masistoide/centralista sea sometido (por lo menos) por el Órgano judicial; vía controles, resoluciones, sentencias, y en lo sucesivo, en cuanta especie  y subespecie jurígena emane de su labor y naturaleza jurisdiccionales.

  

Finalmente estaríamos ante nuevas magnitudes de legitimidad y credibilidad, de agentes que pertenecen a un ámbito estatal llamado a controlar el estado de las garantías y derechos del pueblo boliviano frente a los sistemáticos abusos que infringen los Órganos estatales subordinados al apetito de la circunstancia y oportunidad.

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*No tanto así su praevia face seleccionaria, condicionada a los juegos políticos legislativos. Así mismo sin ponderar the formal budget discussion that makes the rules (unfair, improvised, biased and political) of the "screening" of judicial nominations.

** On the same note German teacher Carl Schmitt, a disciple and follower of Max Weber, praises his theory over the figure of charismatic leader (the President, popularly elected over the representativeness of Parliament). charismatic figure propped in his work "Keeper of the Constitution" among others, it in turn is consistent with Weberian caudillista version, which is said to: " someone who is internally called to be leader of men" ; in " politician and scientist " . Matching the two finally in strengthening presidential authority, consistent with the perfume of the Nazi Führer.

* ** Weber nature corresponded Parliament with the "legal rule", because of its "legislative monopoly." And in turn, contrasted in subordination, the "legal rule" to what I would call "charismatic domination" itself that has greater strength in his legitimacy by virtue of the recognition of all the "dominated" in the single figure of the President.
turn the rigging "charismatic domination" with the kind of "plebiscite democracy," and "legal domination" with the other species of " parliamentary democracy. " And it is this same distinction that Weber is justification to reinforce his idea that the plebiscite, popular vote, invests robust legitimacy to the figure of President ( primus inter pares) in respect of the collegial body of parliamentarians .

addition to endless arguments scholars believe that Weber knew that the counterweight of the figure of popularly elected President in respect of Parliament, had to do with the fact that ( for example) the Prussian state at the time, because of their well-being for the other Länder, could easily determine its parliamentary representation to direct the destinies of the Republic affecting the German national interests.